In Which I Lambaste Mike Brown (with a poke at Doc Rivers as well)

The other week when I talked about the horrorshow that is the Cleveland offense, I stated that Mike Brown is a bad offensive coach, figuring I didn't need to provide examples. But he provides them anyway, and not just of his teams' "get the worst shot possible given our talent" philosophy with the ball, but for a guy with a supposed great pedigree for defensive principles, oversees a team prone to some shocking breakdowns.
(Note: the bulk of this was written before the Cavs suspended Andrew Bynum for conduct detrimental, my thoughts on that are appended to the end)
Cleveland "wasted" a "great" Kyrie Irving performance in losing to Atlanta in double OT last night. I'm using scare quotes generously here because Kyrie wasn't actually that good, using 41 possessions (!) to get his 40 points, while allowing Jeff Teague to go for 34 and 14 (using a slightly more efficient 33 possessions). And really, it was more or less a lot of the same one-on-one hero ball, the shots just happened to fall last night:
Cleveland "wasted" a "great" Kyrie Irving performance in losing to Atlanta in double OT last night. I'm using scare quotes generously here because Kyrie wasn't actually that good, using 41 possessions (!) to get his 40 points, while allowing Jeff Teague to go for 34 and 14 (using a slightly more efficient 33 possessions). And really, it was more or less a lot of the same one-on-one hero ball, the shots just happened to fall last night:
But I've come not to praise Kyrie Irving, but to bury Mike Brown. As I subtitled when talking about the Cavs the first time, there is an extreme lack of imagination with this team, and the attempted game winner at the end of regulation is a perfect example of boring, predictable play calling that takes poor advantage of personnel. It's a tie game, with .9 seconds left, so you need a catch and shoot. ANY catch and shoot, yet he runs a play where the most likely outcome is a 3-pointer from a guy who can't even see that far:
Unless Brand completely falls asleep and doesn't help on Kyrie here:
the player who is going to get the shot here is Anderson Varejao off of this basic pick and pop action. With different lineups, this play can work. This afternoon, down three, Brown called much the same play, but with Earl Clark in for Varejao:
The failure of this play was not in design, but in execution - Irving goes too early here:
Being down three today almost forced Brown to call the right play since he knew he needed three, the failure of imagination and personnel on Thursday was in not calling a play designed to put players in a position to succeed. Since the game was tied, why is the play being run for Irving at the arc? If everything is closer to the hole, Varejao actually might get a makeable shot, or Brand might not feel as comfortable helping on Irving.
By running the play a little tighter in, the likely shot on the pop is a left elbow jumper for Varejao, where he's very good, and not just this season (shown below) but throughout his career:
So that's a failure of offensive planning. In the Atlanta game there were also some failures on defense. First of all, lineups. Kyrie Irving is widely and rightly regarded as a sieve on defense, yet he guarding one of Atlanta's two most dangerous perimeter options on both the following plays, and in both cases was a key part of the defensive breakdown. First, Teague's game winner:
I've talked before both here and on the podcast about not loving guards using a quickness mismatch to get a pull up midranger, but this situation is obviously different in that the value of the extra point from a three is nil over the value of a two pointer, so getting a slightly easier shot in terms of raw percentage is far preferable.
The critique of Brown here is that having Kyrie in the game and on Teague (instead of say Dellavedova or Jack guarding Teague) is that he either schemed "switch everything," which is a the correct strategy if up 3 (more below), or had to realize a switch was coming, basically allowing Atlanta to ensure a favorable look for themselves.
Oddly, at the end of regulation, up 3, the Cavs were not switching anything, allowing Teague a wide open look at the 3 which tied the game:
The critique of Brown here is that having Kyrie in the game and on Teague (instead of say Dellavedova or Jack guarding Teague) is that he either schemed "switch everything," which is a the correct strategy if up 3 (more below), or had to realize a switch was coming, basically allowing Atlanta to ensure a favorable look for themselves.
Oddly, at the end of regulation, up 3, the Cavs were not switching anything, allowing Teague a wide open look at the 3 which tied the game:
Without being in the Cavs' huddle, I can't be certain, but it doesn't not appear they were prepared to switch screens in this instance, despite this being the perfect time to switch everything since a switch into a mismatch is not really dangerous as long as no one gets an open look from 3.
And to be fair to the Cavs, the individual breakdowns in terms of failing to totally account for time and score happens to well coached teams as well. A few weeks back, I looked at Dallas almost giving up a tying 3 in the same spot:
And to be fair to the Cavs, the individual breakdowns in terms of failing to totally account for time and score happens to well coached teams as well. A few weeks back, I looked at Dallas almost giving up a tying 3 in the same spot:
And Thursday night even saw a well-coached team and a heady player make the same mistake, as Portland was down 3 vs. the Clips. After the game, the TNT crew took issue with the Clippers not fouling, but 9.3 on the clock (with the Blazers having a TO) is possibly a little too much time to make fouling effective strategy. Plus, there was never an opportunity to foul:
The error here is Chris Paul of all players not playing time and score. Though the fact that there is 9.3 on the clock changes the dynamic slightly, there is no great reason he needs to stay basket side of Lillard here:
Portland needs a 3, so Paul should probably be "outside" of Lillard, to take away the danger area:
In effect, allowing Paul and Griffin to "bracket" the play, not allowing any potential three point looks:
Much like the Cavs play, the Clippers appeared to be under instructions to not switch, which allowed Portland to create the space for Batum.
This "bracket" strategy, by the way, is how Boston played the end of game situation today - notice how Jeff Green is cognizant of his help both towards the baseline with Humhpries sagging off the inbounds passer as well as to the opposite side of the floor with Jordan Crawford and Avery Bradley:
This "bracket" strategy, by the way, is how Boston played the end of game situation today - notice how Jeff Green is cognizant of his help both towards the baseline with Humhpries sagging off the inbounds passer as well as to the opposite side of the floor with Jordan Crawford and Avery Bradley:
he gaping wing holes the team has. Brown seems to have finally realized his best lineups include all 3 guards together, but now his best lineups usually involve Jarrett Jack checking a small forward. This mismatch goes both ways, but through Jack's midrange heavy style, probably favors any opponent with a marginally competent offensive SF. These fairly simple end of game errors are costing the Cavs games at both ends of the floor. But that only covers half of a coaches job. The other half is motivating players. Between the Waiters/Irving feud and Bynum's apparent mental checkout, Brown appears to be failing on this note as well. Add to that his horrific handling of Anthony Bennett - up until today, he has received sporadic minutes and has been yanked at the first mistake. By not allowing Bennett to learn from his failures and mistakes, he has in effect assured his continued propensity for both. Not a great return for any high lotto pick let alone a #1 overall.
Nor should Cleveland's management escape here. Their last few offseasons have been great examples of each individual move being defensible, but collectively showing no real plan of attack. Drafting Bennett and signing both Bynum and Earl Clark is curious - you just picked a guy first overall and are signing guys to either directly (Clark) or indirectly (Bynum, but shifting some of Varejao's time to the 4) who block his development, and doing so with players who are either barely above replacement level or huge gambles or both. Signing Jarrett Jack when he his 100% duplicative of Irving and Waiters was also questionable considering the gaping wing holes the team has. Brown seems to have finally realized his best lineups include all 3 guards together, but now his best lineups usually involve Jarrett Jack checking a small forward. This mismatch goes both ways, but through Jack's midrange heavy style, probably favors any opponent with a marginally competent offensive SF. covers half of a coaches job. The other half is motivating players. Between the Waiters/Irving feud and Bynum's apparent mental checkout, Brown appears to be failing on this note as well. Add to that his horrific handling of Anthony Bennett - up until today, he has received sporadic minutes and has been yanked at the first mistake. By not allowing Bennett to learn from his failures and mistakes, he has in effect assured his continued propensity for both. Not a great return for any high lotto pick let alone a #1 overall.
Nor should Cleveland's management escape here. Their last few offseasons have been great examples of each individual move being defensible, but collectively showing no real plan of attack. Drafting Bennett and signing both Bynum and Earl Clark is curious - you just picked a guy first overall and are signing guys to either directly (Clark) or indirectly (Bynum, but shifting some of Varejao's time to the 4) who block his development, and doing so with players who are either barely above replacement level or huge gambles or both. Signing Jarrett Jack when he his 100% duplicative of Irving and Waiters was also questionable considering the gaping wing holes the team has. Brown seems to have finally realized his best lineups include all 3 guards together, but now his best lineups usually involve Jarrett Jack checking a small forward. This mismatch goes both ways, but through Jack's midrange heavy style, probably favors any opponent with a marginally competent offensive SF.
Nor should Cleveland's management escape here. Their last few offseasons have been great examples of each individual move being defensible, but collectively showing no real plan of attack. Drafting Bennett and signing both Bynum and Earl Clark is curious - you just picked a guy first overall and are signing guys to either directly (Clark) or indirectly (Bynum, but shifting some of Varejao's time to the 4) who block his development, and doing so with players who are either barely above replacement level or huge gambles or both. Signing Jarrett Jack when he his 100% duplicative of Irving and Waiters was also questionable considering the gaping wing holes the team has. Brown seems to have finally realized his best lineups include all 3 guards together, but now his best lineups usually involve Jarrett Jack checking a small forward. This mismatch goes both ways, but through Jack's midrange heavy style, probably favors any opponent with a marginally competent offensive SF. covers half of a coaches job. The other half is motivating players. Between the Waiters/Irving feud and Bynum's apparent mental checkout, Brown appears to be failing on this note as well. Add to that his horrific handling of Anthony Bennett - up until today, he has received sporadic minutes and has been yanked at the first mistake. By not allowing Bennett to learn from his failures and mistakes, he has in effect assured his continued propensity for both. Not a great return for any high lotto pick let alone a #1 overall.
Nor should Cleveland's management escape here. Their last few offseasons have been great examples of each individual move being defensible, but collectively showing no real plan of attack. Drafting Bennett and signing both Bynum and Earl Clark is curious - you just picked a guy first overall and are signing guys to either directly (Clark) or indirectly (Bynum, but shifting some of Varejao's time to the 4) who block his development, and doing so with players who are either barely above replacement level or huge gambles or both. Signing Jarrett Jack when he his 100% duplicative of Irving and Waiters was also questionable considering the gaping wing holes the team has. Brown seems to have finally realized his best lineups include all 3 guards together, but now his best lineups usually involve Jarrett Jack checking a small forward. This mismatch goes both ways, but through Jack's midrange heavy style, probably favors any opponent with a marginally competent offensive SF.