Step Off, Youngin

Wizards Underwhelming Pick-and-Roll Attack

Yesterday, I looked in depth at some of the cleverness that makes San Antonio so deadly in their half court execution.  Today, I want to give the same treatment to the Wizards.  It seems slightly churlish to be critical - they did just have an enormous Game 1 victory over Chicago. But, I don't think it was their offensive execution which paved the way: Nene made a lot of midrange shots - 7/12 from areas where he shot 43.4 % during the regular season, and the Chicago offense (like the Chicago offense does) sputtered.

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Despite some excellent interior presence and 3 point shooting (especially from the corners, where to his credit, John Wall is excellent at creating shots for teammates), Washington's offense is massively reliant on the midrange game.  In large part, this is caused by the primary creators in the Wizards' pick-and-roll heavy attack inability to consistently either get to the rim or create high value paint or 3 point looks for teammates.

This is not to say the Wizards are hopeless as both Bradley Beal and Wall show flashes of ability to read the defense and vary the pace of their attack.  For example, yesterday I talked about how the Spurs are able to avoid a trap in a blitzed PnR by hitting the screener on the "short roll" in space. Here is an example of Beal executing this to perfection in game 1 resulting in great ball movement and an open 3:

Also among the positives, Wall is more than capable of attacking with speed. It's his main attribute, as in this play where he challenges Taj Gibson's lateral quickness and wins:

However, the Wizards in general and Wall in particular tend to give themselves only one way to win in these scenarios. Wall seems to make a decision on how he's going to approach a given pick-and-roll early, and not deviate from that based on how the defense plays him. This is largely a result of him simply moving too fast for his own good.  One of the great Woodenisms is "be quick, but don't hurry." Wall is in a hurry all too often in the pick-and-roll, which both limits his options and doesn't give him time to survey the floor and make decisions.

As an example, on this pick-and-roll, his speed coming off the screen works to his disadvantage:

First of all, it's not just in speed coming off the screen - he also starts his move slightly too early, forcing Marcin Gortat to set the screen slightly lower on the flower than would be ideal, not really get solid contact on Kirk Hinrich, and then have no space for an effective roll to the basket:

Instead of waiting for Gortat to take get in position to set the screen at the arc (which would also give Trevor Ariza adequate time to space to the corner, Wall goes early, meaning when he comes off the screen he's facing a wall of three defenders, plus Joakim Noah in ideal help position:

Wall thus has limited driving angles, and he's extremely close to the screener, leaving Gortat no angle to roll and receive a pass, compare with the spacing Tony Parker gets by coming off the screen a little higher on the floor and at a broader angle:

Some of this is the Spurs simply having better spacing, but Parker has allowed the spacing to develop by taking his time. There is no reason the Wizards cannot space the floor given the three point shooting ability of their wings.

In any event, faced with no obvious options, Wall plays into the defense's hands, and settles:

This is a semi-contested mid-range jumper, with the defense still perfectly aligned and thus in great position to control the defensive rebound. And he's taking it with 13 seconds on the shot clock because he gave himself no options.

And it's not all a result of poor offensive spacing or timing. On this play, Wall gets good spacing and waits for Gortat to get a solid screen, but makes up his mind early that he's shooting a pull up instead of attacking:

The good spacing gives Wall and/or Gortat plenty of room to operate:

And with Carlos Boozer dropping very deep to below the foul line, Wall "Snakes" the pick-and-roll to get back to the middle of the floor and in a great position to challenge the defense with a quickness advantage:

Wall is in a ideal situation to either get himself to the basket or get his teammates an open corner 3 by drawing Jimmy Butler, or a layup by forcing Gibson to contest at the rim. But instead, again, he settles instead of being slightly more patiently aggressive:

This 16 foot pull up isn't a terrible shot by any means, but there are still 14 seconds on the shot clock, and this should count as an extremely disappointing outcome to what was an highly advantageous position.

Wall's tendency to rush the play also hurts him against ICE defense:

He's sprinting off the pick and giving himself no time to survey the floor and Gortat no time to either roll to the basket or pop to the elbow. Compare with what we saw from Manu Ginobili yesterday:

And even when Wall chooses not to settle, he doesn't commit both defenders to allow for a 4-on-3 on the rest of the floor:

Again, this isn't bad. Nene takes and makes a decent shot,but the Spurs consistently get better shots from their PnR attacks by creating more time and space. Compare how Ginobili is able to commit the screen defender (in that case Dirk Nowitzki), while Noah is never put in any real distress, leaving Nene with far less space to operate and make a play than Boris Diaw received:

Finally, the absence of any sort of change of pace or hesitation from Wall's game in the pick-and-roll actually serves to negate the advantage his speed should provide, as the help defender not only knows what's coming but exactly when and how fast, which leads to Gibson being able to slide and block Wall's layup here:

Wall does give the barest of inside-out moves, but a staple of many other point guards is hitting the defender with a hesitation dribble or a stop-and-go, such as Jeff Teague in this early season example: 

Unlike Wall, who's move is made while still moving at full speed, Teague slows down just enough to lull Andre Drummond before exploding past him. Wall is even more explosive in terms of acceleration than Teague, so this type of change of pace could be devastating to the league's big men out on the floor.

I should close by saying that some of this criticism isn't totally fair - the Wizards are playing against a superior defensive team, with Gibson and especially Noah being highly skilled at reading and reacting to what Wall or Beal are doing with the ball. Further, the Wizards don't have quite the same personnel around their ball-handlers.  With due respect to Nene and Gortat, Diaw and Tim Duncan are simply more skilled options in terms of either receiving the ball out on the floor or rolling and finishing in traffic.  Not to mention, there is every indication that the decision to settle for early mid range jumpers is partially a coaching decision.

But those caveats aside, for the Wizards to go from good to great offensively, a little more patience and better execution in this staple play from their young guards will be a necessity.

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