Blake Griffin, DeMarcus Cousins and Finishing the Play (Blake vs. DMC part two)
This is so unlike Blake... This may become something of a belabored point on this here blog, but role matters a great deal when deciding between two players. Much as we can see the mammoth front line in Detroit being less than the sum of their parts, or Wes Matthews looking like an All-Star in Portland where he might look uglier on a team where he was expected to do more with the ball, a player's production is a function of both his talent and how well that talent fits the tasks he is put in a position to perform by his teammates and system. The importance of fit has a great deal of relevance to the Blake vs. DMC discussion.
In part one, I talked about some reasons why I think DMC would be the superior "first option" for a team. In this segment, I'll look at areas where Blake has the definite edge, "finishing" the play. This doesn't necessarily mean Blake shoots, more that the end product of a well-run play is Griffin ending up with the ball in an attacking position rather than the offense starting that way. Just to illustrate the comparison, here is DMC initiating the offense from the low block - he gets the ball early in the clock, draws the double team which leads to an open shot after an extra pass. As Blake does not tend to get double-teamed in the post, simply throwing him the ball there doesn't force the defense to move and react in the same way:
As with Indiana's defense, not overhelping thereby putting defenders in closeout or rotation situations is good for the defense; axiomatically failing to force them to commit to help is bad for the offense.
However, while Cousins is better in an offense initiation role due to his ability to draw help and distort the defense's shape, he doesn't necessarily rise to the level of good enough to want that to be your primary option. Post scoring is not particularly efficient, averaging about .82 PPP leaguewide vs. .91 for all possessions. It's also harder to get post shots in late game situations both because of the extra physical leeway defenders tend to get both before and after the catch in crunch time, and because it's difficult to run a post play which gets a shot off at the appropriate time. (This last is a major if not THE major reason why quarter and game ending shots are so difficult. The element of surprise is removed to a degree as the defense has a great idea when the shot is occurring which allows far more focus on who is going to take it and pressure on the area of the floor where it is likely to occur. But I digress). So for a team with real ambitions, these two players (since Griffin is a worse post player to begin with) are probably best off as secondary, finishing options rather than primary/initiating options.
Certainly in transition, Blake is one of the more efficient (as well as most spectacular) players in the league, as well as being a good passer. Cousins, though an underrated and surprisingly fast player in transition, often makes the mistake of believing that because he CAN handle the ball and lead the fast break, he should do so - he turns the ball more than one out of every 5 transition possessions so far this season. (This may be an early season aberration as it is a significantly higher rate than last year.)
Griffin's advantages as a play finisher can be seen in his success as a pick-and-roll player. His combination of strength, agility and explosiveness make him a great foil for Chris Paul in the Clips middle PnR game. He isn't the most efficient player in the league as a roll man (currently 28th per Synergy) but he's well above average while finishing more plays as a PnR roll man than anyone else in the league - without doing the heavy lifting, his net "Points Above Replacement Play" as a roll man have to be among the highest of any single player and shot type in the league. Since pick-and-rolling is in general a more efficient play than a post up, Blake's primary offensive weapon is almost 12 pts/100 more effective than Cousins postups.
And if anything, those numbers understate his effectiveness given his ability to catch the ball on the move and make a quality pass:
However, while Cousins is better in an offense initiation role due to his ability to draw help and distort the defense's shape, he doesn't necessarily rise to the level of good enough to want that to be your primary option. Post scoring is not particularly efficient, averaging about .82 PPP leaguewide vs. .91 for all possessions. It's also harder to get post shots in late game situations both because of the extra physical leeway defenders tend to get both before and after the catch in crunch time, and because it's difficult to run a post play which gets a shot off at the appropriate time. (This last is a major if not THE major reason why quarter and game ending shots are so difficult. The element of surprise is removed to a degree as the defense has a great idea when the shot is occurring which allows far more focus on who is going to take it and pressure on the area of the floor where it is likely to occur. But I digress). So for a team with real ambitions, these two players (since Griffin is a worse post player to begin with) are probably best off as secondary, finishing options rather than primary/initiating options.
Certainly in transition, Blake is one of the more efficient (as well as most spectacular) players in the league, as well as being a good passer. Cousins, though an underrated and surprisingly fast player in transition, often makes the mistake of believing that because he CAN handle the ball and lead the fast break, he should do so - he turns the ball more than one out of every 5 transition possessions so far this season. (This may be an early season aberration as it is a significantly higher rate than last year.)
Griffin's advantages as a play finisher can be seen in his success as a pick-and-roll player. His combination of strength, agility and explosiveness make him a great foil for Chris Paul in the Clips middle PnR game. He isn't the most efficient player in the league as a roll man (currently 28th per Synergy) but he's well above average while finishing more plays as a PnR roll man than anyone else in the league - without doing the heavy lifting, his net "Points Above Replacement Play" as a roll man have to be among the highest of any single player and shot type in the league. Since pick-and-rolling is in general a more efficient play than a post up, Blake's primary offensive weapon is almost 12 pts/100 more effective than Cousins postups.
And if anything, those numbers understate his effectiveness given his ability to catch the ball on the move and make a quality pass:
Further his efficiency numbers in PnR are hurt somewhat arbitrarily by his poor FT shooting (Griffin is 12-22 on FTs resulting from being fouled on rolls). Griffin's speed and agility also allows him to run multiple consecutive pick and rolls or "flip" the same PnR multiple times on the same possession. When combined with a wizardly point guard such as Chris Paul, this only makes him and the broader offense more effective. For example, in the following play, the Clippers effectively run 3 consecutive PnR's before Paul gets sees the defensive breakdown he wants:
Note this whole sequence took only 5 seconds on the shot clock:
As I talked about yesterday, effective and efficient use of the 24 second clock is vital to a functioning NBA offense, and being able to pack so many looks into such a small time window helps keep the Clippers from low value, late shot clock situations.
Blake's mobility also let's him run continuous PnR's from opposite sides of the floor, which can break down even the best defenses:
Blake's mobility also let's him run continuous PnR's from opposite sides of the floor, which can break down even the best defenses:
By comparison, Cousins is a far less successful off the ball player, averaging .12 PPP less as the roll man, while committing almost twice as many turnovers. Despite his surprising mobility for his size, Cousins is less agile, and a far less natural changer of direction than Blake. He is often hesitant in moving towards the basket, leading to forced shots and turnovers. And unlike Griffin, who seems to have an excellent understanding of whether to roll or pop based on the defensive coverage, Cousins much prefers to pop or fade into a spot up/iso situation:
Though he scores on the above play, isolation play is not kind to Cousins - he's shooting 12-32 on the season when he tries to put the ball on the floor in this spot. He is shooting the ball well on the catch and shoot so far this season (20-34), though he has not historically been great (47-130 last year). But his own shot performance is somewhat beside the point, as when he pick-and-pops he is not forcing the defense to move and misshape itself. He is not causing Rodney Stuckey to have to crash the paint thus opening up McLemore in the corner - compare with Griffin's ability to get Willie Green an open look by rolling shown above:
For his abilities off the ball and in transition, Blake is a superior offensive weapon to DMC in a smaller more secondary role either would assume as their team improves. Of course, as we discussed a bit on Sunday, we don't yet know if Cousins can become a significantly more efficient player if he is allowed a more complimentary offensive role. We might find out as Rudy Gay and his volume shooting are coming to town. In the third and final part of this comparison, I'll examine defense and the ability to stay on the floor.
As a followup to the last part of our discussion on the podcast on Sunday, Amin ElHassan has an interesting piece (in$ider only) today talking about the importance of the midrange.
Even with the skewed reward system, at the end of the day an open shot is [usually] more efficient than a contested one.
But basketball is a living and breathing organism, and offenses and defenses are in a constant flux of adaptation and reaction. The long 2PA is a bad shot because of the math, but also because there aren't many great long 2PA shooters in the league (the lost art of the midrange).
Even with the skewed reward system, at the end of the day an open shot is (usually) more efficient than a contested one. As such, it stands to reason that as more and more teams adopt the type of defensive principles practiced by the Pacers and Bulls, the greater the need for players who are able to exploit the inherent weakness in the system: the midrange jumper.
He then cites two examples of the kinds of open midrange shots good defenses might give up as the kind of looks which become important to hit at a high clip:
It seems crazy, but last night marked the quarter mark of the regular season. Pretty soon the things that we're wondering about as far as small sample size hot or cold streaks (Paul George's shooting, Kyrie Irving's shooting, the Blazers or the Nets to take two examples of each) have to be considered real things.
This post edited about 27 times for grammar and clarity. I badly need an editor. Will trade editing for .gifs
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